

SPECIFICATION
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TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Be it known that we, **Timothy ROSCOE**, a citizen of the United Kingdom and resident of San Francisco, California, **Joseph B. LYLES**, a citizen of the United States and resident of Mountain View, California, and **Rebecca ISAACS**, a citizen of the United Kingdom and resident of Cambridge, United Kingdom, have invented a new and useful:

**ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM FOR
CLUSTER-BASED COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT**

the following of which is a specification.

BACKGROUND

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to cluster-based computing environments and, more particularly, to methods and systems for structuring and implementing access control in such an environment.

2. Description of Related Art

The science of computing has undergone rapid changes in recent years. In the past, computer applications were largely restricted to execution on a single machine, comprising a single processor. Often, the machine on which the application is executed would take the form of a server, accessible over a network by client machines. With the recent growth of the Internet, network-based computing has become more and more commonplace.

Within the past decade, the computing and networking industry has begun to embrace the concept of a cluster-based computing environment. In a cluster-based computing environment, a number of computers may be clustered together (e.g., physically proximate to each other, on one or more racks for instance), interconnected to one another by a network switching system. A computer application may then be divided into parts, each of which may be executed on a separate machine of the cluster, and communication between the constituent parts of the application may occur via the switching system.

SUMMARY

When interconnected to a larger computer network such as the Internet, a cluster-based computing environment is ideally situated to function as a host processing platform for third party services. In such an arrangement, the computing environment may be referred to as a

"public computing platform," in that it may be made available to host services that are provided by members of the public.

A public computing platform may take various forms and serve various functions. In an exemplary implementation, for instance, a public computing platform may take the form of a cluster-based computing environment for a number of paying customers. In that regard, some of the customers who provide applications for execution on the platform may be competing with each other for business.

The computing platform may be connected to the Internet, via a gateway for instance, and the customers may be providers of Internet services, who are themselves generating revenue from their service (such as by charging end users or advertisers) and paying the provider of the public computing platform to host their services. Further, in an ideal arrangement, a compelling business case will exist for the platform to host many more services than there are physical computers making up the platform.

A public computing platform may therefore generally involve three players: (i) application providers, (ii) the platform provider, and (iii) end users. An application provider is a party who provides an application to be executed on the public computing platform. The application provider may, for instance, provide the platform provider with the set of code (e.g., compiled object code) defining the application in one or more components and may further provide the platform provider with a specification indicating resource requirements (e.g., operating system, memory, bandwidth, inter-component communication, etc.) of the application. There may be many application providers, some of whom may be in competition with each other. In an exemplary arrangement, application providers will pay the platform provider for computational and network resources to be employed in providing their services.

The platform provider, in turn, may own the platform on which the services run. Unlike existing arrangements, a platform provider should ideally be able to concurrently manage many mutually untrusting applications, to provide resource guarantees to the application providers, to bill the application providers accordingly, and to rapidly change application resource allocations if the need arises.

Finally, the end users may be those who use the applications provided by the application providers and run on the platform. For instance, the end users may access platform-based services via the Internet or other communication channel.

The use of a cluster-based computing environment as the public computing platform is advantageous in several respects. For one thing, a cluster-based computing environment may be readily scaled to accommodate growth in the market for services and growth in demand for resources by existing services. For another, since the cluster-based computing environment is made up of a number of computers, the platform can concurrently support a variety of processor instruction sets (e.g., Intel PCs, Sun Microsystems SPARC servers, Apple Macintosh, etc.) and a mixture of operating systems (e.g., Microsoft Windows®, Sun Solaris®, Linux®, etc.) Still further, a robust public computing platform that is embodied in a cluster-based computing environment can omit any middleware layer or other such restrictions, so as to more freely allow the platform to accommodate pre-existing applications (or applications written without regard to the structure of the computing platform) and to help free up processing resources.

Unfortunately, however, a public computing platform structured in this way also suffers from inherent risks as well. For instance, since the platform should be able to support many third party services, not all of which can be equally trusted, a risk exists that one service running on the platform may seek to access or modify another service running on the platform. This is

especially the case where applications running on the platform are competing, antagonistic, malicious or roguish (e.g., where the owners of the applications don't trust each other's applications, where the author of one application is a hacker intent on malicious destruction of another application or of the platform as a whole, or in some other circumstance). Further, a risk exists that one service may use resources (such as CPU time, physical memory, network and disk interface bandwidth, or storage space, for instance) that have been allocated to, required by, and paid for by another service. Consequently, a robust public computing platform should preferably secure the state of each service running on the platform from unauthorized access or modification by other services running on the platform.

An exemplary embodiment of the present invention is thus directed to an access control method and secure public computing platform. In accordance with the exemplary embodiment, the public computing platform is embodied in a cluster-based computing environment comprising a number of processing nodes interconnected via a switching system such as one or more network interconnect switches. A plurality of applications, each defining a number of application components are loaded onto the processing nodes, such that inter-node communication may occur between the application components via the switching system.

In the exemplary embodiment, as applications come and go, application components are intelligently distributed throughout the computing platform. In placing the application components, notions of trustworthiness and criticality of the components (or of the services of which they are a part) may come into play. For instance, a decision may be made to physically isolate (e.g., load on separate processing nodes) an application component that is deemed to have a low level of trustworthiness (such as a component of an application provided by an

unknown third party) from an application component that is deemed to be highly critical (such as a component of an application provided by a high-paying highly-reliable party).

Further, in the exemplary embodiment, access control may be implemented through packet-filtering within the platform. In particular, given a set of application components installed within the platform, a set of access control rules can be established, indicating allowed (or equally indicating disallowed) inter-node communications between application components. The rules can then be mapped onto a set of logic within the platform, such as packet-filters, static routes or VLAN logic within an interconnect switch, or firewall logic within a processing node, for instance. In turn, when an application component attempts to communicate with another application component, the logic may detect the attempted communication (as a communication between nodes and/or application components) and may determine whether the communication is allowed. If the inter-component communication is not allowed, the logic may then block (or cause to be blocked) the attempted communication.

Thus, in one respect, an exemplary embodiment of the invention may take the form of a method of managing communications between service components in a cluster-based computing environment. Such a method may involve (i) configuring filter logic in the cluster-based computing environment with rules representative of allowed inter-node communications between service components, (ii) detecting an attempted inter-node communication between service components, (iii) applying the filter logic to determine that the attempted inter-node communication is not allowed, and (iv) responsively blocking the attempted inter-node communication.

In another respect, an exemplary embodiment of the invention may take the form of a method for managing application logic in a public computing platform. The method may

involve (i) receiving specifications of at least two computer-program applications, the applications cooperatively comprising a number of application components, (ii) generating access control rules defining allowed communications between the application components, (iii) loading the application components of the at least two applications onto at least two of the processing nodes of the public computing platform, whereby the processing nodes may then execute the application components, and (iv) provisioning the public computing platform to allow inter-node communications comprising the allowed communications between application components and to disallow other inter-node communications. In this way, in response to an attempted communication between application components, the public computing platform may determine that the attempted communication is not allowed and may responsively block the attempted communication.

In yet another respect, an exemplary embodiment of the invention may take the form of a public computing platform. The platform may include a network switching system, a plurality of processing nodes interconnected via the network switching system, and a plurality of application components loaded onto the processing nodes. Each application component may have a respective service-access-point that defines a network address of the processing node on which the application component is loaded and a port at the processing node, the being associated with the application component. Further, the platform may include logic that indicates allowed inter-node communications between application components. The logic may be executable, in response to an attempted inter-node communication, to make a determination of whether the attempted inter-node communication is allowed. Further, the logic may be executable, in response to a determination that the attempted inter-node communication is not allowed, to block the attempted inter-node communication.

These as well as other exemplary aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art by reading the following detailed description, with reference where appropriate to the accompanying drawings.

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

An exemplary embodiment of the present invention is described herein with reference to the drawings, in which:

Figure 1 is a simplified block diagram of a cluster-based computing environment suitable for supporting a public computing platform in accordance with the exemplary embodiment;

Figure 2 is another simplified block diagram of a cluster-based computing environment suitable for supporting a public computing platform in accordance with the exemplary embodiment;

Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating the architecture of an exemplary processing node in a public computing platform; and

Figure 4 is a sample communication flow diagram depicting allowed communication between application components in an exemplary public computing platform.

**DETAILED DESCRIPTION
OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENT**

1. Exemplary Service Platform Architecture

Referring to the drawings, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a public computing platform 10
5 arranged in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. As shown in
Figure 1, the exemplary public computing platform may include three types of components, (i)
processing nodes 12, (ii) interconnect switches 14 and (ii) a gateway switch 16. Of course, it
should be understood that this and other descriptions and illustrations provided herein are
intended to be only exemplary. Modifications may be made, including the rearrangement,
10 addition and/or omission of components and functions.

Each of the processing nodes 12 may be coupled with each of the interconnect switches
14, and each of the interconnect switches may be coupled with each of the other interconnect
switches and with the gateway switch 16. Gateway 16 may then be coupled with (or be part of)
another network such as the Internet, for instance. With this arrangement, public computing
15 platform 10 may thus operate as a localized network, in which interconnect switches 14 route
communications between the various processing nodes and between the processing nodes and the
gateway 16, and gateway 16 routes communications between the public computing platform and
entities outside of the public computing platform.

Generally speaking, the processing nodes 12 may be any conventional server computers
20 or other machines on which services may be executed. Each processing node may thus include a
processor and an operating system, as well as a data storage medium suitable for holding
machine language instructions executable by the processor. Within the platform, the various
processing nodes 12 may conveniently have various different processors and operating systems.

Alternatively, all of the processing nodes may have the same processors and operating systems as each other.

The interconnect switches 14 may also take various forms. For instance, each interconnect switch may be an IP routing switch, capable of forwarding IP packets at line speed based on information such as IP address (OSI layer 3) and/or UDP or TCP port numbers (OSI layer 4). In the exemplary embodiment, each interconnect switch may be a SmartSwitch Router 8600 (SSR-8600), available from Enterasys Networks of Andover, Massachusetts. Advantageously, the Enterasys switch supports 120 Ethernet/Fast Ethernet ports, 30 Gigabit Ethernet ports, 4 million layer 4 application flows, and 800,000 layer 2 MAC addresses. Further, the Enterasys switch includes a packet-filtering agent capable of providing up to 20,000 security/access filters specified through a provisioning interface. In addition, the Enterasys switch is capable of conventionally serving up to 4,096 virtual local area networks (VLANs) based on port or protocol. Another exemplary interconnect switch is the Alcatel Omnicore 5052 switch, available from Alcatel of Spokane, Washington.

As shown in Figure 1, more than one interconnect switch may be provided. In this regard, interconnect switching functions may be distributed among more than one interconnect switch, and/or the switches may be redundant to facilitate fault tolerance in the event of a failure of a switch, link, interface card or other component of the computing platform. For many purposes, the exemplary configuration can therefore be implemented and viewed in the simplified manner shown in Figure 2, albeit with lower fault resiliency.

The gateway may be a layer 3/4 switch capable of routing packet traffic between the platform and an outside network such as the Internet as well as performing a variety of load balancing operations based on layer 7 application data. In the exemplary embodiment, the

gateway may be a Content Smart web switch available as Model CS-800 from ArrowPoint Communications of Acton, Massachusetts. Like the other components, the gateway router can of course take other forms as well.

2. Exemplary Logic Architecture

5 In the exemplary embodiment, a public computing platform may include a set of *services* (or, equivalently, "applications") executing on the platform, a *control plane* for globally managing resources and controlling service execution, and a local resource manager, called a "*nucleus*," for each node.

a. Services and Capsules

10 Each service to be executed on the platform may define one or more service components, each of which may be referred to as a "*capsule*." While some services may run on a single machine (node), many will be distributed in nature, so as to provide fault tolerance and scalability, for instance. Each capsule may thus be loaded onto, and executed by, a respective processing node in the platform, thereby defining the responsibility of that processing node with respect to execution of the service.

15 Further, to facilitate execution of a given service, the capsule(s) of the service may be allowed to communicate with other capsules (of the given service or of other services) on one or more other nodes via interconnect switch 14. Similarly, to facilitate communication between a given service and an entity outside of the platform, a capsule of the service may communicate
20 with the entity via the interconnect switch 14 and the gateway 16.

Conveniently, the services that are to be executed on platform 10 may be pre-existing services, such as services written without consideration of the platform structure. Examples of such services include (i) a game server, such as a Quake III server, (ii) a web server, such as an

Apache server, (iii) a database server, (iv) an e-commerce server, and (v) other server or non-server applications.

In practice, the form of a capsule may vary depending on the operating system running on the capsule's node. For example, a capsule running over Linux[®] might be a process or process group (along with associated resources containers, quotas, etc.), whereas a capsule running over VMWare might correspond to a virtual kernel. Other examples are possible as well.

b. Nuclei and Node Architecture

Figure 3 is a simplified block diagram depicting the architecture of an exemplary processing node 12 in platform 10. As shown in Figure 3, exemplary node 12 includes a hardware layer 20, an operating system layer 22, and an application layer 24. The hardware layer 20 may include a processor such as an Intel Pentium class processor, data storage media such as a disk drive and memory, and a network interface card to facilitate communications to and from the node. The data storage media may function to store machine language instructions defining the operating system and capsules.

The operating system layer 22 may conventionally define a commodity-based server operating system, such as Windows[®] 2000, Linux[®], Linux[®] extensions such as QLinux, any of the BSD-derived Unix[®] systems, or Solaris[®]. Alternatively, the operating system may be one that offers some virtualization and isolation capabilities, such as VMware, Ensim ServerXChange or Nemesis, for instance. As shown in Figure 3, the operating system layer may conventionally include a kernel (for interfacing with and managing the hardware layer) and a set of standard operating system modules (such as DLL modules in a Windows[®] environment), for instance. In the exemplary embodiment, each capsule executes directly over the operating

system, without any service platform-mandated middleware layer between the capsule and the operating system.

The application layer 24 may, in turn, define the capsules to be executed on the processing node. Figure 3 illustrates three capsules of exemplary node 12. However, a given node could have just one capsule or any number of capsules, as desired.

Further, the application layer 24 may also define other executable code, such as code to help manage execution of capsules running on the platform. As noted above, one such set of code may be the nucleus, which may be responsible for starting and stopping execution of capsules on the node in response to commands from a control plane, for monitoring the state of capsules and services, and for reporting status of capsules and of the node to the control plane.

The nucleus may function to map the capsule abstraction to operating system resources such as processes and quotas. For example, the nucleus on a given node may function as an interface between the control plane and capsules on the node, so that the control plane can send instructions to the nucleus without having any particular knowledge about the operating system and/or resource allocations on the node, and the nucleus can take appropriate action in response.

For instance, the control plane may send commands to the nucleus such as "import capsule X", "stop capsule Y", or "change resource allocation to capsule Z". The control plane might not know that a given capsule is a Unix process group, or that a particular resource allocation for a given capsule translates into a set of QLinux shares for CPU, disk and network bandwidth. Rather, the meaning of these concepts may be specific to the node operating system (and, in some cases, to the application itself), so the nucleus may be arranged to implement the concepts.

To facilitate communication between the nucleus and third party applications installed on the node, the nucleus may be arranged to implement facilitates such as those that a human user (e.g., an administrator) would normally invoke to install, start, stop, monitor or otherwise interface with programs on the node. The facilities may be shell or command line instructions to the operating system, for instance, or may take other forms.

In order to enable the control plane to manage capsules running on the platform, scripts in a scripting language such as SafeTcl can be established, defining a set of commands and parameters that each nucleus is arranged to understand and follow. For instance, one command may instruct a nucleus to start a given capsule (specified as a parameter). Another command may instruct a nucleus to stop a given capsule. And still another command may be a polling request, seeking an indication from the nucleus as to the state of a given capsule on the node. This arrangement is similar to use of Unix startup scripts in the /etc/rc.d or /etc/init.d directories (or similar places in other flavors of Unix), where a shell script is provided for each service to stop and start in an orderly and standardized manner when the machine starts up or shuts down, regardless of the particular steps required to control each service.

In this regard, when a new service is loaded onto the platform, the nuclei and/or control plane may be programmed with the identity of the service's capsule(s), so as to be able to manage (e.g., install, run, terminate and monitor) the capsule(s). Further, a configuration script may be established for the service and for its component capsules, so as to allow the control plane to readily deploy the service on the nodes of the platform. (In addition, since many services may share the same implementation (e.g., multiple instances of the Apache server), parameterized instances of ready-made scripts may be established as well.)

Further, the nucleus may function to install extensions to system-wide shared-libraries or other user-space system services, and/or kernel extensions if the operating system permits. For instance, a nucleus running on Windows[®] 2000 might install a Layered Service Provider into the Winsock protocol stack to enforce network interface quality-of-service guarantees to capsules.

5 As for status reporting, the nucleus could be a fully asynchronous application (which issues no blocking system calls, and uses no synchronous RPCs), arranged to send state reports to an IP multicast group monitored by the control plane. Further, the control plane can communicate with the nucleus in the form of datagrams sent to a well-known UDP unicast port on the node, for instance.

10 **c. Nucleus-Capsule Interface**

15 In order to facilitate management and monitoring of capsules, the nucleus should be arranged to interface with each capsule on the node (e.g., for starting and stopping the capsule and for monitoring capsule health and resource allocations). As noted above, however, a capsule may be a component of a pre-existing service and may be loaded onto a node for execution. Consequently, it is inherently difficult to design a nucleus-capsule interface in advance, before the capsule has been identified or loaded onto a given machine. For example, the set of procedures to shut down a web server might be very different from the set of procedures required to perform a similar action on a multi-user game server.

20 In the exemplary embodiment, this problem can be solved by specifying the interface to a given capsule procedurally in a scripting language, such as that described above for instance. Preferably, the scripts may comprise the only capsule-specific code in the nucleus and may be loaded on demand (e.g., per instruction from the control plane) when a particular service is deployed on a set of nodes.

5 The use of small, verifiable scripts in a domain-specific language to express the control and monitoring interface to capsules may allow sufficient express-ability and extensibility to handle most any capsule that is capable of being executed from the command line or a graphical shell, while still retaining a clean separation between the capsule-independent parts of the nucleus, and the capsule-dependent control code. This separation in turn may enable the control plane to deal with an abstraction of capsules without introducing the limitations on capsule implementation inevitable with some kind of advanced "capsule specification."

10 To facilitate monitoring of capsules and services, a platform-aware capsule on a processing node might send heartbeats to the nucleus of the node. Alternatively, the nucleus may poll the operating system of the node to determine the state of capsules (particularly non-platform-aware capsules) running on the node. The nucleus may then report the state information to the control plane (using the predefined scripting language, for instance), autonomously or in response to a query from the control plane.

15 d. Control Plane

20 In the exemplary embodiment, the control plane may function as the analog of an operating system, bearing responsibility for all aspects of managing the platform as a whole. To facilitate this level of control, the control plane may communicate with the nuclei of the various processing nodes. In particular, in the exemplary embodiment, the nuclei may multicast messages to the control plane so as to notify the control plane of events related to node hardware, system software and capsule state, for instance. And the control plane may unicast control messages to specific nuclei, so as to start and stop services, alter resource allocations, and mandate other actions, for instance using a scripting language as described above.

The control plane may be embodied as a software subsystem of the platform (as a service running on the platform). As such, the control plane may be logically centralized. However, in a robust embodiment, the control plane will be implemented as a number of distributed components (as highly trustworthy and highly critical capsules). Some of this distribution is a division of functionality; the use of multicast by the nuclei makes it easy to add new monitoring functionality to the control plane in the form of stand-alone processes that listen to the multicast group. However, the main reason for distributing the control plane is to provide fault tolerance through replication; if a node running the control plane goes down, another replica can take over the system using techniques well known in the field of reliable computing.

Broadly speaking, the control plane can be said to implement policies that then use the mechanisms of the platform hardware and system software. The functionality of the control plane can be divided into a number of areas, including (i) providing an external platform interface, (ii) deployment and monitoring of service, (iii) monitoring nodes and nuclei for failures and (iv) controlling of network elements.

First, the control plane may provide a central point of contact for human operators and external management and accounting systems to interface with the platform. In this regard, the control plane may maintain a picture of platform state, and may be responsible for generating auditing and billing traces, as well as providing an external control interface for its functions.

Second, while the nuclei are aware of capsules and the mapping of capsules onto hardware resources (processes, etc.), it is the control plane that preferably maintains a view of entire *services*. In particular, the control plane may be responsible for deploying, starting, stopping, and undeploying entire services (rather than simply capsules). Further, in the exemplary embodiment, the control plane may also handle the distributed nature of services and

the platform itself, by performing capsule *placement* so as to distribute both load and risk throughout the platform. (In this regard, for instance, the control plane could quite simply try to place a given capsule on each node until a node is found that matches the resource requirements and other constraints of the capsule; alternatively, the control plane could exhaustively examine every possible combination of capsules and nodes and then pick the "best" combination, according to some metric such as free resources, highest mean level of trust, or the like.) Similarly, the control plane may dynamically handle resource allocation across services and between nodes in the platform.

Third, the control plane may monitor processing nodes and may take action in response to various events. For instance, in response to the failure of a node or nucleus, the control plane may decide to restart the failed node and may send an instruction to the node accordingly. Alternatively, in response to such a failure, the control plane may automatically place onto new (other) nodes the capsules that were running on the failed node.

Fourth, the control plane may also function to provision the gateway 16 and interconnect switches 14 so as to provide access control. In this regard, as services are loaded onto or removed from processing nodes, and as capsules are migrated between nodes (e.g., autonomously in response to a node failure, or in response to user command), the control plane may program the gateway 16 and/or interconnect switches 14 so as to maintain access control within the platform and between the platform and external entities.

In particular, the control plane may send program instructions to the gateway 16 (according to, and via, a provisioning-interface specified by the gateway) to provision the gateway with appropriate network address translation (NAT) and firewalling, so as to direct external traffic to proper services within the platform and to allow only authorized traffic to enter

the platform from the outside network (and to help prevent attacks from outside the platform). Further, the control plane may send program instructions to an interconnect switch (according to, and via, a provisioning-interface specified by the interconnect switch) to provision the interconnect switch with packet filtering (e.g., IP packet filters), static routes (e.g., static IP routes) and/or other facilities, so as to restrict inter-node communications between capsules within the platform.

e. System Services

In addition to including a control plane and nuclei to facilitate management of services running on the platform, the platform may itself provide some *system services* that may be used in conjunction with other services on the platform. The system services may be provided by the platform provider and may therefore be considered part of the platform.

An example of a system service is a persistent file store, upon which capsules running on the platform may depend. In this regard, for reliability, the platform provider may impose a rule that, while any service can depend on a system service, no system service can depend on an application service (i.e., a service provided by an application provider).

3. Receiving Services

As noted above, an application provider may provide to the platform provider a set of program code that define a service, which the platform provider may then run on behalf of the application provider. In doing so, the application provider may provide a specification indicating the resource requirements and other requirements of the service and its constituent parts.

The application provider may or may not prepare and provide an application as a number of capsules. In the exemplary embodiment, for instance, the division of a given application into a number of capsules may be based upon a variety of factors, such as resource management,

security and placement. Based on these or other factors, the application provider and/or platform provider may specify the capsules that define a given application. Each capsule may be loaded onto at least one respective node in the platform to be executed.

4. Protecting Platform Integrity

A robust public computing platform should employ security measures to protect the integrity of the platform itself and the integrity of the services that run on the platform. In this regard, a judgement may be made as to the criticality and trustworthiness of particular aspects of the platform, such as particular services or capsules running on the platform, and a respective scope of protection may be put in place for the various aspects of the platform.

According to the exemplary embodiment, the protection may involve intelligently placing (distributing) capsules within the platform, so as to (i) provide greater protection for more critical capsules and (ii) help safeguard against problems that may be caused by less trustworthy capsules. Further, the protection may involve imposing restrictions on inter-node communications between capsules, so as to help avoid harmful or disruptive communications between capsules.

a. Types of Platform Failures

To appreciate the concepts of criticality and trustworthiness, it is useful to first understand what types of failures could occur within a public computing platform. As a general matter, failures can be categorized as either (i) *platform-level* failures, (ii) *application-level* failures, or (iii) *capsule-level* failures.

A platform-level failure is a failure of some component of the service platform itself, as opposed to a failure of a third-party service. Examples include the failure of a node, cutting a network link, a failed disk, or a crash of one or more capsules in the control plane or of a system

service module. Another example might be a serious breach of trust by a malicious capsule, which may permit the malicious capsule to cause a software failure that stops one or more nodes from operating in accordance with intended procedures, or that consumes excessive resources and thereby prevents the platform from providing required (and perhaps contractually stipulated) resources for another application running on the platform. Still another example may be a serious breach of security, where a malicious capsule gains access to personal, financial, commercial, or other data that is subject to an obligation of confidentiality (e.g., pursuant to a contract between the platform-provider and an application-provider). Platform-level failures are the ones the platform provider needs to worry about most, since they can directly affect the viability of the platform itself.

Platform-level failures may be detected by the infrastructure (hardware, nuclei, control plane and associated platform services) of the platform. As noted above, the control plane performs the monitoring function (with the assistance of the nuclei, for instance.) And the platform provider should as much as possible mask the effects of platform-level failures from both services running on the platform and the end-users of such services, such as by use of redundant links and switches, for instance.

Application-level failure and capsule-level failure, in contrast, are failures of a particular third party service, where the underlying infrastructure of the platform has played no role in the failure. Further, since the platform preferably functions to insulate a particular application from others, these categories of failures may also exclude failures due to other applications in the system.

The term "application-level failure" is used to describe a third party service failure that is detectable by and visible to the platform. For instance, an application-level failure may be a

capsule crashing due to buggy code. A nucleus may detect such an application-level failure by detecting the absence of a heartbeat signal from a capsule, by polling the operating system, or by other means. In response, the nucleus may notify the control plane, and the platform may take some action as a result, such as restarting the capsule in question for instance.

5 From the perspective of the platform provider, an application-level failure is the application's fault and should not constitute a problem for the integrity of either the platform or other applications. However, the platform provider may offer as a value-added service the ability to restart capsules that have suffered application-level failure.

10 In contrast, the term "capsule-level failure" is used to describe a third party service failure that is not detectable by and visible to the platform. An example might be a live-locked area of a multithreaded capsule that still reports healthy operation to the nucleus, or corrupt data that does not crash the capsule but causes the capsule to behave in an incorrect, application-specific manner. Since capsule-level failures are not detected by the platform, they should be detected (if at all) within the application.

15 Responsibility for handling a capsule-level failure lies entirely with the application. The platform (control plane) will not detect the failure, and will only take action in response to a request from the application or something else (such as the application provider phoning the platform provider). Otherwise, the platform clearly cannot take action since it is unaware of the problem. However, in the exemplary embodiment, platform-aware services might be arranged to
20 detect capsule-level failures and to responsively request the platform to take action (such as by killing and then restarting the capsule).

b. Degrees of Risk

In the existing art, computing systems have been characterized as being either totally trusted and bug-free or totally untrusted. Computer science theory and practice has not been able to provide widely applicable or useable mechanisms for proving programs correct. Thus, in general, it is impossible to prove that a program is entirely trustworthy or bugfree. Rather, the current practice is generally to make educated guesses as to whether a given application is trustworthy or not, based on factors such as the reputation of the application provider and legal agreements for instance.

This notion is especially true in the environment of a public computing platform, where third parties may supply most of the applications that run on the platform. The platform provider may never see the sources of a program and may therefore be unable to verify the assertions of the application provider regarding trustworthiness of the program.

In truth, however, an application is usually not totally trustworthy or totally untrustworthy. Rather, an application may more likely trustworthy to some degree individually or in comparison to other applications. Thus, for instance, an application could be characterized as "probably trustworthy" or "likely to be more trustworthy than another application."

Similarly, it is generally not possible to certify that an operating system running on a given node is entirely reliable. Therefore, it is difficult or impossible to assign an absolute rating as to how well an operating system may enforce protection between applications that run on a given node. This is true both for classic security issues -- such as malicious attacks by one application module on another (the electronic equivalent of breaking and entering) -- and for failure to provide contractually agreed resources. Possibly at best, an operating system, and

therefore the node running the operating system, may be characterized as "pretty good" or "better than another operating system."

Further, the consequences of failure to enforce security and resource constraints in a public computing platform are likely to vary greatly. At one end, for instance, failure to protect the control plane could compromise the entire platform. At the other end, for instance, failure to protect certain types of services running on the platform (non-critical services) may simply cause mild annoyance for the end users.

c. Trustworthiness and Criticality

In the exemplary embodiment, to help facilitate a determination of how services should be distributed in the public computing platform, the trustworthiness and criticality of various objects (e.g., capsules, services, nodes, etc.) may be assessed. In this regard, the concepts of trustworthiness and criticality involve matters of judgement, based on business relationships, experience, and other factors. Therefore, it is not possible to define the concepts of trustworthiness and criticality with precision. However, once values are assigned to represent measures of trustworthiness and criticality, the values can then be used to help secure integrity and security in the platform.

(i) Trustworthiness

The concept of trustworthiness of an object is intended to capture the extent to which the platform provider believes it will "behave itself." It is an assessment of the potential threat the object poses to other objects. Such a notion will be different-valued for different classes of object (capsules, applications, nodes, etc.) and is also a *multi-dimensional* vector, rather than a scalar quantity. For example, dimensions of trustworthiness might include resource usage, memory protection, etc.

10
The trustworthiness T of a capsule c may be defined as $T_{cap}(c)$. Trustworthiness in this context is how much the platform provider believes that the capsule won't misbehave, such as by doing something unanticipated and undesirable, an example of which might be deliberately corrupting system files. $T_{cap}(c)$ is independent of any node on which the capsule might run, and so really refers to how much the platform provider trusts its code and its owner (this might include notions of fees, penalties, etc.) As such, it may be the kind of notion relevant in a service level agreement. However, in order to reason about the capsule's placement in the platform, the capabilities of the node on which it will be running should also be considered.

10
Thus, trustworthiness $T_{cap}(c)$ may be modified by the properties of the node on which the capsule is running. In this regard, each node in the platform may have an associated set of protection and isolation capabilities, which might be quite strong (e.g., with Eros, Nemesis, AS/400, Ensim, etc.), quite weak (e.g., with Linux[®], NT, etc.) or somewhere in between (eg., with QLinux, etc.). It is therefore possible to define the trustworthiness T_{run} of a particular capsule c when it is running on a node n with a particular set of protection facilities or properties P , as $T_{run}(P, c)$.

Clearly $T_{run}(c)$ is a function of $T_{cap}(c)$. A highly trusted capsule will remain highly trusted regardless of the node on which it is running, but not much more can be said. For instance, a highly *untrusted* capsule is not necessarily untrustworthy provided it is running on a highly secure node.

20
 T_{run} can be extended to cover a collection of capsules c_1, \dots, c_r all running on the same node, as $T_{run}(P, c_1, \dots, c_r)$. Intuitively, there is a partial order on the values of T_{run} . Adding a capsule to a collection on a node should never increase the degree to which the platform provider trusts the collection, since this would imply that the extra capsule exercised some "policing"

function, which itself implies a lack of protection between capsules. Hence a platform provider might trust a collection of capsules on the same node no more than the provider trusts any one capsule in the collection (on the node):

$$T_{run}(P, c_1, \dots, c_r) \leq T_{run}(P, c_i) : \forall i, 1 \leq i \leq r$$

5 Therefore it is possible to define the trustworthiness of a set of capsules running on a node as a minimum on the partial order:

$$T_{run}(P, c_1, \dots, c_r) = \inf_{1 \leq i \leq r} \{T_{run}(P, c_i)\}$$

10 Using this trustworthiness measure, it is possible to begin assessing the impact of placing a given capsule c' onto a given node n with functionality P , where the node is already hosting a set of capsules $\{c_i\}$.

(ii) Criticality

15 The concept of criticality of a capsule is intended to capture how important the platform provider feels a capsule is, or more precisely how worried the platform provider might be about what other capsules might do to a given capsule. A capsule might be highly critical for a number of reasons. For instance, it might be part of the control plane, or it might be owned by a service provider who is paying a premium for a very high degree of availability. The criticality C of a capsule c , $C(c)$, is a property of the capsule itself and is independent of the platform on which it
20 is running. Further, a collective criticality C of a set of capsules c_1, \dots, c_r running on a node can be defined as $C(c_1, \dots, c_r)$.

As with trustworthiness, there is an intuitive partial order on criticality. Adding a new capsule to a collection of capsules does not make the collection any less critical. However, it may make the collection more critical. Thus:

$$C(c_1, \dots, c_r) \geq C(c_i), \forall i, 1 \leq i \leq r$$

Further, as with trustworthiness, we can define the criticality of a collection of capsules running together as:

$$C(c_1, \dots, c_r) = \sup_{1 \leq i \leq r} C(c_i)$$

(iii) Relationship Between Trustworthiness and Criticality

The measures of trustworthiness and criticality of a given capsule can be entirely independent of one another. At the extremes, for instance, a given capsule can be assessed with (i) high trustworthiness and high criticality (e.g., capsules of the control plane), (ii) high trustworthiness and low criticality (e.g., a cut-price pre-packaged static content web server), (iii) low trustworthiness and high criticality (e.g., an application provided by a high-paying customer who is likely to spy on competitors' applications), or (iv) low trustworthiness and low criticality (e.g., arbitrary code written by an unreliable programmer).

Notwithstanding the lack of a relationship between trustworthiness and criticality of a given capsule, the concepts are to some extent duals of one another. In particular, the trustworthiness of a capsule c may indicate how worried a platform provider is about what the capsule may do to other capsules, and the criticality of a capsule may indicate how worried the platform provider is about what other capsules may do to the capsule.

d. Determining Capsule Placement

When a new service is provided to the platform, the capsule(s) of the service should be loaded onto one or more nodes in the platform. Further, when a new capsule is introduced into the platform, or in response to a failure or other event, a platform provider or platform may responsively migrate capsules from one node to another, so as to better distribute the capsules.

The determination of where to place a given capsule in the platform, may be based on a variety of factors. For example, specifications provided by the service provider may dictate at least in part where capsules should be placed. For instance, if the service provider has specified that the application or capsule should be run over a particular operating system, or should be provided with particular node-resources (e.g., storage capacity, bandwidth, etc.), then a determination may be made that the capsule may only be executed on a node that runs the specified operating system and provides the specified node-resources.

In addition, according to the exemplary embodiment, placement of capsules may be advantageously based on measures of trustworthiness and criticality. In this regard, to determine whether to place a particular capsule c on a given node n in the platform, a determination may first be made as to what set of capsules $\{c_i\}$ would be run together on the node. If no other capsules would be run on the node with capsule c , then the set $\{c_i\}$ would consist of only capsule c . If other capsules are already loaded on the node or would be run on the node together with capsule c , then the set $\{c_i\}$ would consist of multiple capsules.

Next, a determination may be made as to whether it would be acceptable to run the set of capsules $\{c_i\}$ on node n with capabilities P . To make this determination, the trustworthiness T and criticality C of the set of capsules $\{c_i\}$ may be assessed and considered. The greater the trustworthiness of the set, the more likely placement of the capsule c in set $\{c_i\}$ on node n is to work in practice. Furthermore, the lesser the criticality of the set, $\{c_i\}$, also the more likely placement of the capsule c in set $\{c_i\}$ on node n is to work in practice.

Consequently, it is possible to define a relation \supseteq between T_{run} and C , and at the same time introduce the *co-location rule*. This rule provides that it is acceptable to run a mix of

capsules c_1, \dots, c_r on a given node with functionality P , if and only if trustworthiness and criticality satisfy the relationship, i.e.:

$$T_{run}(P, c_1, \dots, c_r) \supseteq C(c_1, \dots, c_r)$$

If the values of T_{run} and C are selected from a common set of values, the values can be directly compared. In this regard, the relation \supseteq might become \geq , for instance, meaning that the measure of trustworthiness for the given set of capsules running on the node is greater than the criticality of the given set of capsules. However, other relations \supseteq can be defined as well, and even if the trustworthiness and criticality values are not selected from a common set.

Through this analysis, a platform provider or platform (e.g., control plane logic) can conveniently reason as to the placement of a given capsule, based on the trustworthiness and criticality of the capsule. Of course, other manners of assessing and considering trustworthiness and criticality are possible as well.

e. Imposing Communication-Restrictions

Since the capsules of a given service may be placed on separate nodes of the public computing platform, communications between the various capsules may occur via the switching system of the platform, i.e., via one or more interconnect switch. (The communications may be packet-based, in that at at least some point in the communication path, a given communication is embodied in one or more packets, such as TCP/IP or UDP/IP packets for instance.) For instance, in order for a first capsule of an application to call a code routine defined by a second capsule of the application, the first capsule may generate and send a function call to the second capsule, and the function call may be packaged into a datagram (or sequence of datagrams) and sent via the switching system to the other capsule.

In this regard, each node of the public computing platform (i.e., its network interface card) may sit at a designated physical location in the platform and may have an associated network address. For instance, each node may have a respective IP address. In turn, each capsule running on a given node may be associated with a respective transport port (e.g., TCP port or UDP port) of the node. Consequently, a communication destined for a given capsule on a given node can be sent to the IP address of the node and the transport port of the capsule. As is known in the art, the term "service-access-point" (SAP) can conventionally be used to describe a network location such as an IP address, or a combination IP address and port number, for instance.

Communication should be allowed to occur between the capsules of a given service, and in some cases between the capsule of one service and the capsule of another service (such as between a third party application and a data storage service provided by the platform). However, it may be best to disallow other inter-node communications between capsules, or particular inter-node communications between capsules. Without restrictions on such communication, a capsule on one node could intentionally or unintentionally harm a capsule on another node, or could harm the other node itself. A risk of such harm is particularly acute between antagonistic services (capsules), such as services owned by separate service providers who compete for business (e.g., having one common customer or potential common customer), for instance.

According to the exemplary embodiment, restrictions on inter-node communications between capsules (i.e., inter-node communications to a capsule and/or from a capsule) are imposed by a process that may involve first establishing a set of rules representing allowed inter-node communications between capsules and then mapping the rules onto logic in the public computing platform. In turn, in response to an attempted inter-node communication between

capsules, the logic can determine whether the communication is allowed. If the determination is that the communication is not allowed, then the logic can block the communication.

(i) **Deriving Access Control Lists**

Access Control Lists (ACLs) may be used to express allowed inter-node communications between capsules in the public computing platform. In the exemplary embodiment, an ACL sets forth an intermediate representation indicating allowed communications between capsules. Thus, each rule in an ACL might specify the communicating capsules and a direction of communication between the capsules, if appropriate. At any time, the list of ACL rules may be generated based on the current state of the platform, including which services are active in the platform, what their capsules' communication requirements are, and where the capsules are currently placed in the platform.

Figure 4 depicts an example communication pattern, which may be represented as an ACL. Referring to Figure 4, three capsules are shown, capsule *A*, capsule *B*, and capsule *X*. As shown, bi-directional communication is allowed between capsules *A* and *B*, and both of these capsules can send communications to *X*. However *X* can contact *A* or *B* only through the multicast address AB_{addr} . This example situation may occur, for instance, where *A* and *B* are capsules of the control plane, and *X* represents an untrusted nucleus capsule.

Assuming these are the only rules for the platform, the ACL needed to enforce the situation shown in Figure 4 may be as follows:

- allow source *A* to destination *B*
- allow source *B* to destination *A*
- allow source *A* to destination *X*
- allow source *B* to destination *X*
- allow source *X* to destination AB_{addr}
- deny all other communication

While this set of ACL rules is relatively simple, it should be understood that a given set of ACL rules could vary in complexity. For instance, an ACL rule could be a multi-part Boolean expression, indicating allowed inter-node communications between capsules, and could involve far more parameters than just a source capsule and/or destination capsule. As an example, if communications are to be restricted based on time or date, then an ACL rule may incorporate a time or date parameter as well. Further, communications may be restricted based on level of service or other parameters.

(ii) Mapping an ACL to the Platform

In the exemplary embodiment, the ACL is a hardware-independent representation of allowable inter-node communications between capsules. Once the ACL is established, the rules may then be mapped to a set of logic (hardware, software and/or firmware) within the platform, which may then function to distinguish per-capsule traffic and to enforce the rules in practice.

The logic employed to enforce communication restrictions may take various forms, as can the mechanism used to provision the logic with the rules to be enforced. Examples of suitable logic include, but are not limited to, the following:

(A) PACKET-FILTER LOGIC WITHIN AN INTERCONNECT SWITCH.

A packet-switch, such as the Enterasys SSR-8600 for instance, may provide a set of programmable port filters (e.g., layer 3 or 4 filters), which may be collectively referred to as a packet-filtering agent. The switch will also typically provide a provisioning-interface including a command line through which an administrator or other machine can provide predetermined commands representative of filters to be enforced by the packet-filtering agent. In the exemplary embodiment, the ACL rules can be translated into the appropriate commands and input to the switch, so as to provision the packet-filtering agent.

(B) STATIC-ROUTING WITHIN AN INTERCONNECT SWITCH.

A packet-switch may allow static routes to be established. Thus, for instance, an interconnect switch may be programmed to automatically route to a specified SAP in the public computing platform any communication that originates from a

particular SAP. The switch may also provide a provisioning-interface through which commands may be entered to set up such static routes.

(C) VLAN RESTRICTIONS WITHIN AN INTERCONNECT SWITCH

A packet-switch, such as the Enterasys SSR-8600 for instance, may implement Virtual LANs (VLANs), per IEEE standard 802.1P/Q. If so, then the ACLs can be used to set up VLANs between nodes and/or capsules in the platform. Only nodes connected via a VLAN would be able to communicate. In particular, the switch may distinguish between a number of virtual local area networks (VLANs), each identified by VLAN tags carried by packet traffic. Again, the switch may provide a provisioning-interface through which commands may be entered to set up VLAN logic.

(D) FIREWALL LOGIC OF A NODE

A node may provide firewall security, which may conventionally allow only certain specified traffic to enter the node. The firewall may take the form of software, firmware or hardware logic executed by the node or a component (e.g., network interface unit) associated with the node. The firewall may be set up to allow only the packet communications to the node that the ACL indicates are allowable. The node may provide a provisioning-interface through which commands may be entered to set up the firewall logic.

All of these mechanisms, including filtering in the interconnect switch, can be combined to implement filtering mechanism in systems where hardware constraints (such as limits on the number of filtering rules supported by the interconnect switch) preclude a single implementation approach.

In the exemplary embodiment, the control plane can be arranged to provide a user interface through which a user (e.g., an administrator of the platform) can enter and/or edit a set of ACL rules, with graphic or textual representations for instance. Alternatively, the control plane may receive specifications for new services and may automatically generate ACL rules, based on the specifications. The control plane may then be arranged to automatically send appropriate commands to one or more provisioning-interfaces within the platform so as to set up the logic suitable for enforcing the ACL rules. For instance, presented with a given set of ACL rules, the control plane may send a set of commands to an interconnect switch so as to set up the

packet-filtering agent of the switch, and the control plane may send another set of commands to one or more nodes in the platform so as to set up firewall logic in the nodes. The control plane may further be arranged to pick the best (e.g., most efficient) set(s) of logic to carry out particular communication restrictions.

5 This process of mapping ACL rules to logic within the platform may, to some extent, be an approximation. For instance, if the packet-filtering agent of an interconnect switch is filled to capacity and unable to support any further communication restrictions, and if no other filtering logic is available, some compromise might need to be made; a judgement may be made that some ACL rules are less important than others and can therefore be set aside in favor of the others. In that instance, notions of trustworthiness and criticality may re-enter the process.

For example, communications from highly trusted capsule are less apt to cause problems, so ACL rules for such communications may be set aside in favor of other more important rules. On the other hand, communications to a highly critical capsule may be more viewed as more sensitive, so ACL rules for such communications should preferably be maintained, while other rules may be set aside if possible. Other examples are possible as well.

(iii) Blocking Disallowed Traffic

Once the logic is in place in the platform, the logic can conveniently be employed to block attempted traffic that is not authorized. For instance, when a capsule on a first node in the platform attempts to send a communication to a capsule on a second node in the platform, the packet-filtering agent on the interconnect switch may receive the attempted communication in the form of a packet made up of data (header and/or payload) representing information such as source SAP, destination SAP, service level (e.g., QOS or TOS) or other information. The packet-filtering agent may then compare the data to a stored data structure maintained by the

switch and thereby determine that the attempted communication is in fact not allowed. Consequently, the packet-filtering agent may simply drop the packet (i.e., not route it).

Further, in the exemplary embodiment, the logic may be programmed to take or facilitate remedial action in response to one or more blocked communications. For instance, the logic may be arranged to log blocked traffic and to send an alert message to the control plane and/or to another entity whenever more than a threshold number of blocked communications (e.g., more than a predetermined number of blocked communications originating from a given capsule) has occurred. In response, the control plane may automatically terminate the offending capsule. In this regard, policing functions can be based on token bucket schemes, which are well known to those of ordinary skill in the networking art.

(iv) Example of Communication Control

Consider a small service platform composed of three processing nodes with addresses A, B, and C, together with a gateway router. Let M be the multicast address used to communicate with the control plane, P to be the subnet used for addressing within the platform (so that A, B, and C are all on the subnet P) and I to be the external Internet (i.e., every address except the P subnet and the multicast address range).

Suppose that the platform runs three services:

- The Control Plane itself. This consists of a single capsule on node C, listening on UDP port 14568 to multicast messages sent to the group with IP address M. It unicasts UDP messages back to nuclei on nodes A, B, and C to port 14568. Since the control plane is highly critical, it is the only capsule on node C.
- A Web Server. This consists of a single capsule which accepts TCP connections from outside the platform to port 80 on node A.
- A replicated LDAP server. This consists of two capsules (a master server and a replication slave). The master runs on node B, whereas the slave (which is less critical) shares node A with the Web server. Both capsules accept TCP connections

from outside to port 389, and also communicate with each other by opening TCP connections to port 389.

The following list of ACL rules may represent the allowable communication in such a system, where I denotes any IP address *outside* the cluster, i.e. outside the subnet of A, B and C and outside the multicast address range:

```
Allow UDP source (P,*) destination (M,14568)
Allow UDP source (C,*) destination (P,14568)
Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (A,80)
Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (A,389)
Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (B,389)
Allow TCP source (A,*) destination (B,389)
Allow TCP source (B,*) destination (A,389)
Deny all other
```

A switch like the Enterasys SSR-8600 may implement filter lists which are then applied to sets of ports on the switch. Each filter list consists of a series of match expressions associated with actions (allow or deny), which are evaluated in order. The first expression to match triggers the associated action and terminates the filter. The default, fall-through behavior of the switch is to allow is to discard the packet.

The situation in this example requires four filter lists, one for each port. These filters are as follows, starting with the switch port corresponding to node A (the LDAP master capsule):

```
Allow UDP source (A,*) destination (M,14568)
Allow TCP source (A,*) destination (B,389)
Allow TCP source (A,389) destination (I,*)
Allow TCP source (A,389) destination (B,*)
```

This filter list ensures that packets originating at node A have the correct source address (A). A can make TCP connections to the LDAP port on B, can multicast nucleus messages to the control plane, and can send packets from its own LDAP port to B and the Internet (for LDAP connections set up to it).

Node B runs the web server and the LDAP slave:

Allow TCP source (B,80) destination (I,*)
Allow UDP source (B,*) destination (M,14568)
Allow TCP source (B,*) destination (A,389)
Allow TCP source (B,389) destination (I,*)
Allow TCP source (B,389) destination (A,*)

This is a lot like A, except that the web server can also respond to connections to port 80.

Node C runs the control plane; it only needs to be able to unicast to any node in the platform:

Allow UDP source (C,*) destination (P,14568)

In practice, node C would also be allowed to multicast to the control plane group to permit other control plane components to be added to the mix later, so the complete filter list should look like:

Allow UDP source (C,*) destination (P,14568)
Allow UDP source (C,*) destination (M,14568)

Finally, the gateway G filters incoming packets from the Internet:

Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (B,80)
Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (A,389)
Allow TCP source (I,*) destination (B,389)

As the foregoing illustrates, the number of filters required on the interconnect switch port corresponding to the gateway in the example above increases with the number of service capsules in the system, while the number of filters required on interconnect switch ports corresponding to processing nodes only increases with the number of capsules on that node.

This represents a potential bottleneck for the interconnect switch(s), but fortunately this is not an issue: the filters can be safely offloaded to the gateway content switch. Such switches typically have a far greater number of possible filters, provided that the switch is used with definite "inside" and "outside" networks, as is the case here. In this scenario, the filters on the

interconnect switch port used by the gateway would simply prevent external spoofing of source addresses within the platform:

Allow UDP source (G,*) destination (C,14568)
Deny TCP source (P,*)
Deny UDP source (P,*)

Typically such a switch would also implement a full variety of ACL and NAT functions.

5. Conclusion

An exemplary embodiment of the present invention has been illustrated and described. It will be understood, however, that changes and modifications may be made to the invention as described without deviating from the spirit and scope of the invention, as defined by the following claims.